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Abstract
Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems (ECCs) are utilized as an alternative to traditional public-
key cryptosystems, and are more suitable for resource limited environments due to smaller
parameter size. In this dissertation we carry out a thorough investigation of side-channel
attack aware ECC implementations over finite fields of prime characteristic including the
recently introduced Edwards formulation of elliptic curves, which have built-in resiliency
against simple side-channel attacks. We implement Joye’s highly regular add-always
scalar multiplication algorithm both with the Weierstrass and Edwards formulation of
elliptic curves. We also propose a technique to apply non-adjacent form (NAF) scalar
multiplication algorithm with side-channel security using the Edwards formulation. Our
results show that the Edwards formulation allows increased area-time performance with
projective coordinates. However, the Weierstrass formulation with affine coordinates re-
sults in the simplest architecture, and therefore has the best area-time performance as long
as an efficient modular divider is available.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Modern society largely rely on digital information systems and information storage that
depend on cryptographic services to function properly. A variety of cryptographic al-
gorithms are used to implement common cryptographic services such as: confidential-
ity, integrity, authenticity, access control and non-repudiation. Providing suitable imple-
mentation of cryptographic algorithms both in hardware and in software has become an
increasingly challenging task. There are two main forms of cryptographic algorithms.
Private key algorithms assume that the secret key is (somehow) available to legitimate
participants, while public key algorithms allow two (or more) communicating parties to
negotiate a secret key on demand. Traditionally, public key cryptographic algorithms are
known to have higher computation demands, which reduce their throughput and make
them difficult to implement in hardware. However, due to the key distribution problem
with private-key algorithms, there is an increasing trend of implementing public-key al-
gorithms in hardware.
In the mid-eighties Neal Koblitz [1] and Victor Miller [2] independently proposed us-
ing elliptic curves for public key cryptosystems. Since then, ECC has been intensively
studied, and became popular among other common public-key cryptosystems such as
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RSA, Diffie-Hellman and ElGamal. In [3], Lenstra and Verheul reported that ECC using
a 130-bit key offers comparable security as RSA with a key length of 1024 bits. The
shorter parameter size makes ECC especially attractive for embedded applications. How-
ever, such devices are more prone to side-channel attacks, since the attacker can procure,
isolate, and test such a system without being detected [4–8]. Therefore security against
side-channel attacks is considered to be vital for ECC deployed in embedded systems,
even though it leads to degradation in performance. Several techniques were proposed
for efficient and side-channel attack aware hardware implementation of ECC [9–12]. Un-
fortunately, these techniques use either specialized fields or specifically chosen elliptic
curves. On the other hand, more generic side-channel attack aware implementations in-
volve more complicated equations [13], demand more hardware [14], or leave the system
vulnerable to other types of attacks [15–17]. Hence, providing a high performance non-
specialized implementation, while retaining a degree of side-channel resiliency remains a
challenge.
In 2007, Edwards proposed a novel formulation of elliptic curves and associated point
arithmetic operations defined over all non-binary fields [18]. Bernstein and Lange ana-
lyzed and compared the complexity (in number of elementary field operations) of basic
group operations for different forms of elliptic curves in various coordinate systems [19].
They suggest that the Edwards elliptic curve formulation has superior performance than
the fastest known ECC algorithms. Binary Edwards curves also exist [20], but they are
not in the scope of this work.
Contributions and Outline
This dissertation presents a comprehensive overview and comparison of parameter agnos-
tic hardware implementations of ECC over finite fields of prime characteristics. In par-
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ticular we present optimized hardware realizations of ECC in Weierstrass and Edwards
formulations using affine and projective coordinates. We compare these implementations
in terms of their area and throughput performance. We also realize them in a ECC pro-
cessor both with CMOS technology, and power balanced MOS Current-Mode Differential
Logic (MCML) technology [21] that provides resiliency against differential side-channel
analysis (DCA).
Furthermore, we introduce techniques for improving the performance at various im-
plementation levels without undermining side-channel awareness. In most ASIC arith-
metic units, carry chains cause bottlenecks. Our systematic use of redundant digits for
all modular arithmetic operations is a significant advantage for reaching higher operat-
ing frequencies, therefore we are setting ASIC speed records for prime-field ECC. We
implement Marc Joye’s recently introduced highly regular Add-Always scalar multipli-
cation algorithm, which is proven to be secure against SCA-type attacks and safe-error
attacks [22]. Finally, we introduce a side-channel aware version of NAF scalar multipli-
cation algorithm for Edwards formulation in Algorithm 2.
The organization of this dissertation is as follows. Chapter 2 provides a prelimi-
nary introduction to ECC, defines the main parameters, and introduces the new Edwards
formulation for ECC. Chapter 3 investigates design of ECC building blocks with side-
channel attack precautions. The details for efficient mapping of elliptic curve cryptosys-
tems to hardware are explained in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, the implementation results are
presented. Finally Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation.
Publications relevant to this dissertation:
• D. Karakoyunlu, F. K. Gurkaynak, B. Sunar, Y. Leblebici, ”Efficient and Side Chan-
nel Aware Implementations of ECC over Prime Fields”, IET Information Security,
Volume 4, Issue 1, Pages 30-43, 2010.
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• S. K. Yoo, D. Karakoyunlu, B. Birand, B. Sunar, ”Improving the Robustness of
Ring Oscillator TRNGs”, ACM Transactions on Reconfigurable Technology and
Systems, Volume 3, No 2, Article 9, 2010.
• D. Agrawal, S. Baktir, D. Karakoyunlu, P. Rohatgi, B. Sunar, ”Trojan Detection
using IC Fingerprinting”, Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security
and Privacy, Oakland, CA, USA, 2007.
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Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter, we briefly present the ECC formulations over finite fields of prime char-
acteristics. We first describe the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem, which assures
the computational security of elliptic curve cryptosystems. Then in the first section, we
present the Weierstrass formulation for elliptic curves, and provide the equations for point
addition and point doubling on Weierstrass elliptic curves. In the next section, we present
the Edwards formulation for elliptic curves, and provide the equations for point addition
and point doubling on Edwards elliptic curves. Finally, the third section introduces the
projective coordinates, and provides the point addition and doubling equations with pro-
jective coordinates both on Weierstrass and Edwards elliptic curves. The reader is referred
to [23], for a more detailed treatment of ECC.
In order to construct a cryptographic system, we first need to define a suitable elliptic
curve E defined over a prime field Fp [24]. A cyclic subgroup of E(Fp) can be generated
by selecting a point P of order n, and computing its multiples:
〈P 〉 = {∞, P, 2P, 3P, . . . , (#n− 1)P}
The elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) is defined as determining the
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value k ∈ [1,#n−1], given a point P ∈ E(Fp) of order #n, and a point Q = kP ∈ 〈P 〉.
ECDLP is the underlying number theoretical problem used by ECC. In the cryptosystem,
the private key is obtained by selecting an integer k randomly from the interval [1,#n−1].
The corresponding public key will be Q = kP , and needs to be calculated by scalar point
multiplication.
2.1 Weierstrass Formulation for Elliptic Curves
An elliptic curve E defined over a prime field Fp (with p > 3) can be written in the
simplified Weierstrass form as:
E(Fp) : y
2 = x3 + ax+ b (2.1)
where a, b ∈ Fp, and the discriminant of the curve ∆ = −16(4a3 + 27b2) 6= 0. A point
addition operation is defined as adding two points P = (x1, y1) and Q = (x2, y2) in
E(Fp) resulting in a third point P + Q = (x3, y3) in E(Fp) with the point at ∞ serving
as identity element (P +∞ = P ). Assuming that P 6= ±Q, the point P +Q = (x3, y3)
can be calculated as:
x3 =
(
y2 − y1
x2 − x1
)2
− x1 − x2 (mod p) (2.2)
y3 =
(
y2 − y1
x2 − x1
)
(x1 − x3)− y1 (mod p)
For P = Q the operation is called doubling, and the calculation of 2P = (x3, y3) is
slightly different:
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x3 =
(
3x21 + a
2y1
)2
− 2x1 (mod p) (2.3)
y3 =
(
3x21 + a
2y1
)
(x1 − x3)− y1 (mod p)
Finally, if P = −Q the operation results in point at infinity, and it should be handled
separately.
2.2 Edwards Formulation for Elliptic Curves
In [18], Edwards showed that elliptic curves over a prime field Fp (with p > 3) in the
normal form:
E(Fp) : x
2 + y2 = c2(1 + dx2y2) (2.4)
are bi-rationally equivalent to Weierstrass elliptic curves, and can be efficiently trans-
formed from the short Weierstrass form given in Equation (2.1). The parameter c can be
chosen as 1 without loss of generality. Therefore, it will be assumed to be 1 in subsequent
chapters. Bernstein and Lange introduced explicit equations for performing the transfor-
mation of the ECC coordinates from Weierstrass to Edwards as well as for performing the
group operations on an Edwards curve [19]. The most attractive property of the Edwards
formulation is that the same point addition operation can be used even if the two points
on the curve are equal:
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x3 =
x1y2 + y1x2
1 + dx1x2y1y2
(mod p) (2.5)
y3 =
y1y2 − x1x2
1− dx1x2y1y2
(mod p)
Whereas, in the Weierstrass elliptic curve formulation a separate doubling operation
as shown in Equation (2.3) is needed when P = Q, and special handling of point at infin-
ity is needed when P = −Q. Since only a single type of operation is used, it is reasonable
to expect a higher performance from side-channel attack aware ECC implementations us-
ing the Edwards formulation when compared to those using the Weierstrass formulation.
In addition, in the Edwards formulation, there is no special point at ∞, removing another
special case that has to be handled by implementations. The Edwards doubling formu-
lation can also be further simplified by using the Edwards elliptic curve definition and
rewriting dx2y2 as x2 + y2 − 1 as suggested by Marc Joye to Bernstein et al. in [19].
This optimization makes the point addition and doubling asymmetric, taking away the
side-channel resiliency advantage of unified addition and doubling operations. Never-
theless, Edwards formulation with optimized doubling operations may be utilized with a
side-channel aware multiplication algorithm as in the case of Weierstrass formulation:
x3 =
2x1y1
x21 + y
2
1
(mod p) (2.6)
y3 =
x21 − y
2
1
x21 + y
2
1 − 2
(mod p)
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2.3 Projective Coordinate Systems
ECC implementations may be viewed at several layers. At the point level the main op-
eration is the scalar-point multiplication, which is realized with multiple point additions
and point doubling operations. Each point addition and doubling involves a number of el-
ementary modular arithmetic operations. Modular addition and subtraction are relatively
straightforward to implement. Modular multiplication is a reasonably costly operation.
At the arithmetic level the implementation of the modular inversion is the most costly
operation . The high cost of modular inversion has motivated the investigation of alterna-
tive coordinate representations, which avoid the inversion operation at a cost of increased
number of field multiplications and additions. The classical formulation where a point P
on an elliptic curve E is represented by a pair of elements (x, y) is known as the affine
coordinate representation. The affine coordinates can be transformed into projective co-
ordinates that use three elements to represent a point (X,Y, Z), allowing the numerator
and the denominator to be calculated separately.
A number of projective coordinate transformations have been proposed in the litera-
ture: homogeneous projective, Jacobian, Chudnovsky Jacobian [25], Lopez-Dahab [26],
and mixed coordinates [27]. Homogeneous projective coordinates are rarely used in
Weierstrass formulation, since the number of multiplications required in exchange for
avoiding the inversion is too high. However, Jacobian projective coordinates turn out to
be more efficient and most commonly applied either as is, or in a mixed form with affine
coordinates. On the other hand, due to the balanced form of equations, homogeneous
projective coordinate work well on Edwards elliptic curves.
A Weierstrass elliptic curve defined in Equation (2.1) is converted to Jacobian coordi-
nates as follows:
E(Fp) : Y
2 = X3 + aXZ4 + bZ6
9
where X = xZ2, Y = yZ3. Then the point addition (Equation 2.7) and doubling (Equa-
tion 2.8) formulations with Jacobian coordinates become [25]:
X3 = (Y2Z
3
1 − Y1Z
3
2)
2 − (X2Z
2
1 −X1Z
2
2)
2(X2Z
2
1 +X1Z
2
2) (mod p) (2.7)
2Y3 = (Y2Z
3
1 − Y1Z
3
2)[(X2Z
2
1 −X1Z
2
2)
2(X2Z
2
1 +X1Z
2
2)− 2X3]
−(X2Z
2
1 −X1Z
2
2)
3(Y2Z
3
1 + Y1Z
3
2) (mod p)
Z3 = (X2Z
2
1 −X1Z
2
2)Z1Z2 (mod p)
X3 = (3X
2
1 + aZ
4
1)
2 − 8X1Y
2
1 (mod p) (2.8)
Y3 = (3X
2
1 + aZ
4
1)(4X1Y
2
1 −X3)− 8Y
4
1 (mod p)
Z3 = 2Y1Z1 (mod p)
The addition formulation can be optimized by removing Z2 values, if one of the points
is affine (i.e. Z2 = 1), resulting in so-called mixed point addition. An Edwards elliptic
curve defined in Equation (2.4) is converted to homogeneous projective coordinates as
follows:
E(Fp) : X
2 + Y 2 = Z4 + dX2Y 2
where X = xZ, Y = yZ. The following formulas compute the unified point addition
and doubling (Equation 2.9), and optimized doubling (Equation 2.10) operations with
projective coordinates [19]. Similar to Jacobian coordinates, addition can be optimized in
the case of mixed coordinates.
10
X3 = Z1Z2(X1Y2 + Y1X2)(Z
2
1Z
2
2 − dX1X2Y1Y2) (mod p) (2.9)
Y3 = Z1Z2(Y1Y2 −X1X2)(Z
2
1Z
2
2 + dX1X2Y1Y2) (mod p)
Z3 = (Z
2
1Z
2
2 − dX1X2Y1Y2)(Z
2
1Z
2
2 + dX1X2Y1Y2) (mod p)
X3 = 2X1Y1(X
2
1 + Y
2
1 − 2Z
2
1) (mod p) (2.10)
Y3 = (X
2
1 − Y
2
1 )(X
2
1 + Y
2
1 ) (mod p)
Z3 = (X
2
1 + Y
2
1 )(X
2
1 + Y
2
1 − 2Z
2
1) (mod p)
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Chapter 3
Side-Channel Information Leakage
In this chapter, we explain the sources of side-channel information leakage, classify the
side-channel attacks, and provide algorithmic and implementation countermeasures. In
the first section, we point out how data dependency and conditional executions play a fac-
tor in side-channel information leakage. We discuss the methods to uniformly order the
distinguishable point operations for achieving a scalar point multiplication that withstands
the simple side-channel attacks. We introduce a secure version of NAF algorithm to work
with unified point addition and doubling operations of Edwards elliptic curves. The NAF
algorithm improves the run time of scalar point multiplication by 25%, while our con-
tribution allows it to retain resiliency against simple side-channel attacks. In the second
section, we talk about the countermeasures against differential side channel attacks.
The security of an algorithm is measured in terms of the effort required by the attacker
to extract the secret information. Good cryptographic algorithms are based on number
theoretic problems that have a well studied computational complexity, hence the effort to
break the algorithm is well-known. Algorithm parameters are chosen so that practical at-
tacks are rendered infeasible. However, once an algorithm is implemented in hardware or
in software, the implementation acquires physical properties such as power consumption,
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electromagnetic radiation, surface temperature, or time required to complete an opera-
tion. All these properties that can be observed to vary while cryptograpic operations are
processed, are side channel information sources, which can potentially be used by an ad-
versary to reveal parts of the secret key. Side-channel attacks can be classified into simple
side-channel attacks (SCA), which directly interpret data characteristics that are visible in
a single or a few measurement traces, and differential side-channel attacks (DCA), which
interpret the side-channel differences of correlated measurements. Side-channel attacks
can be further enhanced by applying statistical methods over a template of measurement
traces [28]. While it seems impossible to foresee all possible side-channel attacks that
might emerge in the future, we believe that cryptographic architectures should be de-
signed to withstand side-channel leakage. We call such architectures side-channel aware.
3.1 SCA Countermeasures
Side-channel awareness starts with preventing SCA, which requires avoiding conditional
executions and data-dependent run times in all levels of an implementation. An elliptic
curve cryptosystem is based on multiplying a point on the elliptic curve with an n-bit
scalar. The scalar point multiplication is realized by point addition and doubling oper-
ations, which involve a number of elementary modular arithmetic operations. The first
step of side-channel awareness is developing constant run-time modular arithmetic op-
erations. This requires removing data dependent optimizations, and achieving constant
run-time operations regardless of the inputs. In Section 4.1, we present our implementa-
tions of modular mutliplication, division, addition and subraction operations.
The next step is to design side-channel aware point addition and doubling units that
realize the formulations in Equations (2.2), (2.3), (2.5), (2.6), (2.7), (2.8), (2.9), and
(2.10). The side-channel aware modular arithmetic units allow each point operation to
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be constant-time regardless of the input point coordinates. However, the different formu-
lations of Weierstrass point addition and doubling operations make the side channel char-
acteristics of point addition and doubling distinguishable, which requires the point mul-
tiplication algorithm to uniformly order the additions and doublings in order to achieve
side-channel awareness (i.e. regular point multiplication algorithm). This requirement
also applies to optimized doublings for Edwards formulation, since the optimized point
doubling is also different from point addition. On the other hand, Edwards formulation
allows using a unified point operation both for addition and doubling. In this case, the
point multiplication algorithm does not need to be regular, and therefore a faster irregular
multiplication algorithm can be utilized. The hardware implementation details of point
addition and doubling units are further investigated in Section 4.2.
The so-called binary multiplication methods provide a systematic way of ordering the
addition and doubling operations. In a typical binary multiplication scheme, as the bits
of the multiplicand are processed sequentially, a point doubling is performed for each bit,
and a point addition is performed if the current bit is equal to one. Hence, the run time
of the binary multiplication scheme depends on the number of non-zero bits of the multi-
plicand. On average, for a multiplicand of bit length n, the point multiplication requires
n doubling operations and n
2
point additions. A more advanced binary multiplication
method requires the scalar multiplicand to be recorded into the non-adjacent signed digit
form (NAF) [29]. A NAF binary number will not have two consecutive non-zero digits (1
or -1 in signed digit form), reducing the number of point additions to less than n
2
through-
out a n-bit scalar point multiplication (n
3
point additions on average). While the number
of doublings remains constant, the NAF method leads to a modest linear improvement in
the number of point additions.
Both the standard binary multiplication scheme and the NAF scheme conditionally
perform a point addition (or subtraction) driven by the binary digit values of the secret
14
multiplicand. Side-channel characteristics of distinguishable point addition and doubling
operations can be observed to vary while a point multiplication is carried out, which can
potentially be used by an adversary to reveal parts of the secret key [30, 31]. More-
over, even if the point addition and doubling operations are indistinguishable as in unified
Edwards formulation, the total run time of the point multiplication still depends on the
number of non-zero binary digits of the multiplicand, since point addition is only carried
out when a digit is non-zero. In this case, an attacker observing the run time, could de-
termine the Hamming weight of the multiplicand, reducing the possible solution space
significantly. In the following subsections, we present appropriate point multiplication
methods for different and unified point addition and doubling operations.
3.1.1 Countermeasures for Different Point Operations
When the point addition and doubling operations are different, the only way to make a
point multiplication side-channel attack aware is to use a uniform sequence of point oper-
ations that do not depend on the value of the multiplicand. A method proposed by Moller
performs point multiplication with fixed pattern of doublings and additions with less than
2n point operations in total [17], but it involves a fixed look-up table that makes the system
susceptible to statistical attacks described in [32]. Recognizing this problem, he proposes
a new method to avoid a fixed table [14], employing a randomized initialization stage to
achieve resistance against side-channel attacks. However, when a random number gen-
erator is not incorporated, one has to use a regular multiplication algorithm that involves
one point addition and one point doubling for each binary digit of the multiplicand to
avoid revealing the order and number of the non-zero digits.
One solution to achieve a regular multiplication algorithm is to introduce point addi-
tion operations when the binary digit is zero [15, 16], or inserting dummy atomic oper-
ations to achieve side-channel atomicity [33]. However, this is not always a trivial task.
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If the operations are dummy, they are vulnerable to fault insertion attacks, where the at-
tacker deliberately introduces a fault during an operation and monitors the output for a
change. If the correct output is produced in the presence of faults, the attacker will be
able to conclude that the operation, where the fault was introduced, was a dummy opera-
tion [34, 35].
The so-called Montgomery binary ladder [36] protects against SCA and fault insertion
attacks, since it is highly regular and does not involve dummy operations. Recent studies
has shown that processing the bits of multiplicand from left-to-right, as in Montgomery
ladder, are also vulnerable to certain attacks [37, 38]. In 2007, Joye introduced the add-
always 1 binary scalar multiplication algorithm [22]. This new algorithm (Algorithm 1)
is highly regular, processed from right-to-left, and it requires no precomputation or prior
recoding. Add-always multiplication algorithm always requires n point doublings and
n point additions regardless of the value of the scalar multiplicand, and two temporary
registers are needed to store the results of each iteration. We have utilized the Add-
always algorithm in our implementations where point addition and doubling operations
are different. It should be noted that the standard left-to-right algorithm with dummy
operations allows accumulating the multiplication result in only one register, and using
mixed-coordinates since the coordinates of the input point is kept intact (Z-coordinate of
the input point will be 1). Nevertheless, dummy operations and left-to-right processing
should be avoided, due to the vulnerabilities described above.
3.1.2 Countermeasures for Unified Point Operations
In the case of distinguishable point addition and doubling operations, a side-channel at-
tack aware point multiplication requires using a regular point multiplication algorithm that
1Also referred as: always add-and-double algorithm.
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Algorithm 1 Add-Always Scalar Multiplication Algorithm
Inputs: P ∈ Fp and k = (kn−1, . . . , k0)2 ∈ N
Output: Q = kP ∈ Fp
1: R0 := 0; R1 := P ;
2: for j = 0 to n− 1 do
3: b := 1− kj ; Rb := 2Rb;
4: Rb := Rb +Rkj ;
5: end for
6: return R0
consists of n doubling operations and n point additions for a multiplicand of bit length n.
On the other hand, the Edwards formulation allows unified point addition and doubling
without requiring specialized elliptic curves, or any randomization or initialization stage.
When the point addition and doubling operations are unified, even if the scalar-point mul-
tiplication algorithm is irregular it will not cause simple side-channel leakage as long as
the total number of operations is constant. As it is mentioned in the beginning of this sec-
tion, the NAF point multiplication algorithm always requires fewer than n
2
point additions.
By carrying out necessary number of extra operations after finishing the point multiplica-
tion, the total run-time could be set to the worst case in order to prevent the dependency on
the multiplicand value. However, if these extra operations do not update the value of the
result, the system will be vulnerable to fault-insertion attacks as explained in Subsection
3.1.1. In Algorithm 2, we propose a method that computes the extra operations at the end
of a NAF multiplication, where the additional operations do affect the computed result.
Therefore, the algorithm is also robust against fault insertion attacks. The first 7 lines of
the algorithm compute the NAF point multiplication, with the result stored in R0. Note
that the addition and subtraction operations in lines 4 and 5 are virtually the same oper-
ations on elliptic curves. Moreover, our implementation uses radix-2 signed-digit (SD2)
redundant representation, which makes it trivial to achieve indistinguishable addition and
subtraction operations. All we need to is to swap the wiring of SD2 representation of the
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second operand digits in the case of point subtraction. In line 8, the number of necessary
extra operations is calculated and stored in r, and the register R0 is updated by the sum
of R0 and R1. After this addition, the result can be expressed as: result = R0 − R1.
Throughout the for-loop in lines 9-12, both R0 and R1 are continuously updated for r2 it-
erations, so that 2
⌊
r
2
⌋
extra operations are carried out, while result = R0−R1 still holds.
Finally in line 12, the result is recomputed by the subtraction: R0 − R1. The addition in
line 13 is conditionally performed in order to achieve r + 2 extra point additions in total
regardless of r being odd or even. Hence, the computations will end after 3n
2
+ 2 unified
point operations.
Algorithm 2 Side-Channel Attack Aware NAF Scalar Multiplication Algorithm
Inputs: P ∈ Fp and k = (kn−1, . . . , k0)2 ∈ N
Output: Q = kP ∈ Fp
1: R0 := 0; R1 := P ; a := 0; r := 0;
2: for j = 0 to n− 1 do
3: Recode kj on the fly into non-adjacent signed-digit form with Reitwiener’s method [29].
4: if (kj = 1) then R0 := R0 +R1; a := a+ 1; end if
5: if (kj = −1) then R0 := R0 −R1; a := a+ 1; end if
6: R1 := R1 +R1;
7: end for
8: R0 := R0 +R1; r := n2 − a;
9: for j = 0 to r2 do
10: R0 := R0 +R1; R1 := R1 +R1;
11: end for
12: R0 := R0 −R1;
13: if r is odd then R1 := R1 +R1; end if
14: return R0
3.2 DCA Countermeasures
Differential side-channel analysis allows more powerful attacks that succeed even in the
presence of SCA countermeasures [39]. Comprehensive information about performing
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differential side-channel analysis can be found in [40]. Several classes of countermea-
sures were proposed against DCA, e.g. using noise generators to confuse attackers by
adding random noise to the power signature [41], feeding idle datapath units with random
data to provide a more uniform data profile [42], using masking techniques [43, 44], and
finally using power balanced IC libraries that have data independent power consumption
characteristics [45–47]. For enhanced robustness against side-channel attacks, the design
may be synthesized with such precautions at the circuit level. We synthesized our design
both with standard CMOS technology, and with the power balanced MOS Current-Mode
Differential Logic (MCML) technology [21].
At the algorithm level, DCA resiliency can be achieved by multiplying the point by
a random number prior to each point addition or doubling with projective coordinates.
In Section 2.3, we have stated that homogeneous projective coordinates (xZ, yZ, Z)
are more suitable for the Edwards formulation, whereas the Jacobian coordinates, i.e.
(xZ2, yZ3, Z) are more suitable for the Weierstrass formulation. Prior to each point op-
eration, randomization can be carried out by replacing the point coordinates (X,Y, Z)
with (λX : λY : λZ) in the case of homogeneous projective coordinates, and with
(λ2X : λ3Y : λZ) in the case of the Jacobian coordinates, where λ 6= 0 is a random
number [15]. Hence, if projective randomization is utilized, the Edwards formulation has
further performance benefit of requiring fewer field multiplications, since there is no need
for computing the square and cube of the random number prior to each point addition or
doubling. We do not apply projective randomization, since we do not want to incorporate
a random number generator in our hardware implementation.
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Chapter 4
Efficient Mapping to Hardware
This chapter provides the details for efficient mapping of elliptic curve cryptosystems to
hardware. The mapping process involves a bottom-up methodology. We first design the
modular arithmetic units. Later, we design elliptic curve point addition and doubling units
utilizing the modular arithmetic units. Then, we design elliptic curve point multiplication
units on top of the point addition and doubling units. The organization of this chapter is
as follows:
We first present methods for efficient modular arithmetic in Section 4.1. Our goal is to
achieve the lowest possible area-time product by careful selection and implementation of
modular arithmetic algorithms, while making sure that the arithmetic operations always
have constant run-time independent of the data being processed. Since we are dealing
with large operand sizes, our first goal is to reduce the carry propagation in additions. Our
choice of using redundant binary adder, which utilizes carry save adders with operands in
radix-2 signed digit (SD2) representation, allows us to completely avoid the carry propa-
gation. Therefore, we are able to achieve single clock cycle addition regardless of the size
or value of the operands. Hence, both the side-channel leakage is avoided, and a very fast
addition operation is achieved at the cost of doubling the area in comparison with the area
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of a ripple-carry adder. For multiplication, we employ radix-4 Montgomery multiplica-
tion that processes 2 digits in each iteration, and completes in n
2
+ 2 iterations regardless
of the length n of the operands. For modular division, we employ two different methods.
The first division method computes the division with exponentiation using Fermat’s the-
orem: Z−1 = Zp−2 (mod p), where gcd(Z, p) = 1 [48]. In this method, the division is
very costly in terms of time (3n2
4
+ 3n iterations on average), but there is no additional
area cost. The second division method computes the division using extended binary GCD
algorithm, and completes in only 2n+4 iterations at the cost of 50% increase in area. Our
implementation of modular division with binary GCD algorithm continues to iterate until
the control register is fully processed as suggested in [49], hence it has constant run-time
regardless of the input data. For modular addition and subtraction, we modify the mod-
ular addition method described in [50] to work with the redundant binary adders, and to
have compatible operand range with the modular multiplication and division algorithms.
In Section 4.2, we present the implementation details of ECC point addition and dou-
bling operations for Weierstrass elliptic curves and Edwards elliptic curves both with
affine coordinates and projective coordinates. The point addition and doubling equations
were presented in Chapter 2. In this chapter, we map these equations to hardware, which
requires careful scheduling of modular arithmetic operations in order to complete the
point operation in least possible number of iterations and with smallest possible number
of temporary storage registers.
Section 4.3 gives the details of ECC point multiplication operations. Based on the
side channel leakage properties of binary multiplication methods that were examined
in Chapter 3, we apply the add-always algorithm for all different ECC configurations
(Weierstrass affine point multiplication, Weierstrass Jacobian point multiplication, Ed-
wards affine point multiplication with unified point operations, Edwards affine point mul-
tiplication with optimized point doublings, Edwards projective point multiplication with
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unified point operations, Edwards projective point multiplication with optimized point
doublings), and we apply our enhancement to NAF algorithm for Edwards affine and
projective point multiplications with unified point operations.
4.1 Modular Arithmetic Operations
Modular arithmetic operations are the core operations of ECC. In order to improve the
performance of the overall system, it is crucial to optimize the modular arithmetic opera-
tions. Moreover, in order to avoid side-channel information leakage, operation run times
should not be data dependent. As the first step of ECC implementation, we have designed
the following modular arithmetic components.
4.1.1 Carry Propagation Free Addition with SD2 Representation
Addition is the primary building block in implementing arithmetic operations. If addi-
tion is slow or area-expensive, all other operations suffer from this. In order to achieve
parallel addition of two n-digit redundant binary numbers in constant time without carry
propagation, we used the radix-2 signed digit (SD2) representation that uses the digit
set {-1,0,1} [51], and carry propagation free addition as proposed in [52]. Figure 4.1
shows addition of 2 consecutive SD2 digits using carry save adders. It can be observed
that, signals do not propagate through more than 2 full adders. The n-digit redundant
binary adders (RBAs) are realized by cascading 4-to-2 signed-digit carry-save adders as
presented in [53], which allowed us to keep the critical delay path of computing n-digit
addition within the delay of two full-adders. The RBA is used as the primary building
block in the implementation of the modular arithmetic operations.
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Figure 4.1: Addition of SD2 Digits Using Carry-Save Adders
4.1.2 Radix-4 Montgomery Multiplication
A constant run-time radix-2 Montgomery modular multiplier that uses redundant repre-
sentation is presented in [49]. We have modified this algorithm to perform multiplication
in radix-4, reducing the run time by a factor of 2. This multiplier works by computing
5 steps for each radix-4 digit as presented in Algorithm 3, where LSD stands for least
significant digit.
Algorithm 3 Radix-4 Montgomery Multiplication Algorithm
Inputs: X:= Multiplier, Y:= Multiplicand, M:= Modulus
Output: Z:= Result
Z:= 0;
for i = 1 to n2
Step 1: a:= LSD(X), X≫ 2;
Step 2: P:= a∗Y; (where: a ∈ {−2,−1, 0, 1, 2})
Step 3: Z:= Z+P;
Step 4: Z:= Z+q∗M; (where: q ∈ {−2,−1, 0, 1, 2}, so that LSD(Z)= 0)
Step 5: Z≫ 2;
end for
return Z;
Step 2 requires only a single or double left shift of SD2 digits, whereas Step 3 and
Step 4 require n-digit redundant binary addition operations. The modular multiplier com-
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pletes the n-bit multiplication in n
2
+ 1 iterations through 2 RBA stages. Obviously, the
multiplication result will be in Montgomery residue form (divided by 2n+2). A side-effect
of using a radix-4 multiplier is that the range of operand values has increased from (−M ,
M ) of original algorithm in [49] to (−2M , 2M ), where M is the prime modulus. Figure
4.2 shows the block diagram of the radix-4 Montgomery multiplier.
4.1.3 Extended Binary GCD Modular Division
Modular division is the most costly operation in ECC operations, which is usually avoided
by using projective coordinates to trade several additional multiplications with division
at every point addition cycle. If an efficient division unit could be implemented, the ad-
ditional complexity incurred due to projective coordinates can be avoided. In order to
achieve a high-performance divider, we implemented the modular division presented in
Algorithm 4. This algorithm computes the GCD of the divisor and the prime modulus,
which is equal to 1. Meanwhile, the same operations are applied to the dividend in par-
allel with a modulus reduction after each iteration. When the algorithm terminates by
computing the GCD of the divisor and prime modulus as 1, the same operations applied
to the dividend effectively computes the quotient of the modular division. The binary
GCD algorithm is further optimized by observing the facts that the prime modulus is al-
ways an odd number; and when both numbers are odd, either their sum or their difference
is a multiple of 4. Hence it reduces to following two cases, where Y is the divisor and M
is the prime modulus:
If Y is even, M is odd: GCD(Y,M) := GCD(Y/2,M)
If Y is odd, M is odd: GCD(Y,M) := GCD([Y±M]/4,M)
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Algorithm 4 Extended Binary GCD Modular Division Algorithm [49]
Inputs: X:= Dividend, Y:= Divisor, M:= Modulus
Output: Z:= Result
p:= n; d:= 0; Z:= 0;
while p6= 0 do
while Y is even do
Y:=Y/2; X:=X/2 mod M;
p:=p−1; d:=d−1;
end while
if d< 0 then
swap(Y,M); swap(X,Z); d:= −d;
end if
Y:=(Y+k∗M)/4; X:=(X+k∗Z)/4 mod M; (where: k ∈ {−1, 1})
p:=p−1; d:=d−1;
end while
if M= −1 then Z:=M−Z; end if
return Z;
The modular divider completes n-bit division in only 2n + 4 iterations in (−2M ,
2M ) range. Constant run-time for side-channel awareness is achieved by continuing the
iterations until the control register fully processed as suggested in [49]. For each iteration,
an adder is required for computing the GCD of the divisor and the prime modulus, and
a modular adder is required for applying the same operation to the dividend in parallel
together with modulus reduction. Therefore, a total of 3 RBA stages are necessary (1
RBA for regular addition and 2 RBAs for modular addition). It should also be noted that
the arithmetic operations are carried out in the Montgomery residue format, and division
does not preserve the Montgomery residue form of the operands. Therefore, a division
should be followed by a multiplication to transform the result back into Montgomery
residue form, which increases the effective division time to 5n
2
+ 6 clock cycles. Figure
4.3 shows the block diagram of the extended binary GCD modular divider.
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4.1.4 Modular Addition and Subtraction
The modular addition method described in [50] allows computing the n-bit modular ad-
dition or subtraction via a regular addition followed by a modular correction step that
depends on checking only the most significant 3 digits of the intermediate result. Hence,
modular addition and subtraction can be computed in a single iteration through 2 RBA
stages. This method was also modified to work for (−2M , 2M ) range instead of (−M ,
M ) range of the original algorithm, in order to achieve consistency with the multiplication
and division. The 3M value used in the algorithm is calculated by putting 4M in the low
register, and M in the high register of SD2 representation. Figure 4.4 shows the block
diagram of the modular adder & subtractor.
Algorithm 5 Modular Addition and Subtraction Algorithm
Inputs: X:= 1st Term, Y:= 2nd Term, M:= Modulus
Output: Z:= Result
Step 1: T := X ∓ Y ;
Step 2: if ([Tn+1TnTn−1] ≥ 4) then Z := T − 3M ;
elseif ( 3 ≥ [Tn+1TnTn−1] ≥ 2) then Z := T − 2M ;
elseif ( 1 ≥ [Tn+1TnTn−1] ≥ −1) then Z := T ;
elseif (−2 ≥ [Tn+1TnTn−1] ≥ −3) then Z := T + 2M ;
elseif (−4 ≥ [Tn+1TnTn−1]) then Z := T + 3M ; endif
4.1.5 Combined Modular Arithmetic Units
The modular arithmetic units described above (Figures 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4) are all based on
RBAs, and therefore efficient resource sharing is possible. We have implemented two dif-
ferent arithmetic units. The first arithmetic unit (mmu) is capable of modular multiplica-
tion, addition and subtraction; and it is intended to be used in projective point operations.
The second unit (mau) is additionally capable of modular division; and it is intended to
be used in affine point operations. The first arithmetic unit (mmu) requires 2 RBA stages,
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whereas the second unit (mau) requires 3 RBA stages in order to accommodate for divi-
sion.
When the point multiplication operation is carried out with projective coordinates, a
final division is necessary to have the resulting point in affine coordinates. We realized
this operation by taking the modular inverse of the Z-coordinate using multiplications ac-
cording to Fermat’s theorem: Z−1 = Zp−2 (mod p), if gcd(Z, p) = 1 [48]. Although
this inversion takes much longer (3n2
4
+ 3n on average) than the extended binary GCD
division algorithm, it is carried out only once at the end of a point multiplication. There-
fore, the performance gain in terms of area is more than the performance loss in terms
of time, and it turns out to be more area-time efficient. The number of clock cycles for
different modular operations and the hardware resources in each modular arithmetic unit
are shown in Table 4.1.
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Unit Multiplication Addition & Subtraction Division Resources
mmu n2 + 2 1
3n2
4 + 3n 2 RBAs
mau n2 + 2 1
5n
2 + 6 3 RBAs
Table 4.1: Clock Cycles for Modular Arithmetic Operations
4.2 Point Addition and Doubling Operations
The next step in the design process is implementing elliptic curve point addition and dou-
bling units. Point addition and doubling can be carried out either with affine coordinates
or projective coordinates. Operations with projective coordinates do not involve divi-
sions at the cost of a number of extra multiplications; therefore, they can be implemented
without a modular divider. However, more storage space is needed due to the increased
complexity of the operations, and an additional coordinate for representing a point.
We have designed four different point addition and doubling units (Weierstrass affine,
Weierstrass projective, Edwards affine, Edwards projective), which implement the addi-
tion and doubling formulations in Equations (2.2), (2.3), (2.5), (2.6), (2.7), (2.8), (2.9),
(2.10). In addition to point operations, each unit is also capable of necessary initial and fi-
nal transformations. The initial transform computes the Montgomery residue forms of the
point coordinates. The final transform computes the inverse Montgomery transformation
and projective-to-affine transformation for projective coordinates. We also take advantage
of the homogeneity in Edwards projective operations by avoiding Montgomery transfor-
mations. This is possible since the Montgomery modular multiplications in non-residue
form do not affect the X
Z
and Y
Z
ratios at the end of a point addition or doubling.
For Weierstrass affine unit, we cannot utilize more than one arithmetic unit, due to
the data dependence in point operations. For the others, having multiple units in parallel
is possible. The single unit case always has the best area-time product, since all parallel
units may not be utilized with the same type of operations in all stages of the dataflow.
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Having a single arithmetic unit is also preferable due to the limited area resources of
ECC applications. The Weierstrass implementations require special handling of point at
infinity. During each Weierstrass point operation, a check for whether the resulting point
will be the point at infinity is performed as well. This check is carried out offline (off
the critical path delay) through a n
4
-bit comparator without stalling the point operation.
Selecting the comparator size as n
4
-bit also allows keeping the area overhead low. For bit
values less than 256, the comparator will require 3-levels of (1 + 4 + 16 = 21) 4-input
XOR gates.
Each unit is implemented with a datapath that consists of an appropriate modular
arithmetic unit, a set of input selection multiplexers and temporary registers, and a control
unit as shown in Figure 4.5. The control units for each point operation are designed with
finite state machine strategy, where each state corresponds to an arithmetic operation
through register-to-register dataflow. For each point operation, the arithmetic operations
are scheduled to require minimum number of temporary storage registers after a careful
data dependence analysis. The following subsections detail the implementation process
of point addition and doubling units, and summarize the time and area results for each
unit.
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4.2.1 Weierstrass Affine Point Addition and Doubling
Point Addition
x˜3 = [(
y˜2−y˜1
x˜2−x˜1
)2 − x˜1 − x˜2] mod M
y˜3 = [(
y˜2−y˜1
x˜2−x˜1
)(x˜1 − x˜3)− y˜1] mod M
x3~
1
y3~
y2 ~x1x2~y1~~
Figure 4.6: Dataflow for Weierstrass Affine Point Addition
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RESULT OP CYCLES
0 SET 1
y˜2 − y˜1 SUB 1
x˜2 − x˜1 SUB 1
x2 − x1 MUL n2 + 2
y˜2−y˜1
x˜2−x˜1
DIV 5n2 + 6
( y˜2−y˜1
x˜2−x˜1
)2 MUL n2 + 2
( y˜2−y˜1
x˜2−x˜1
)2 − x˜1 SUB 1
x˜3 SUB 1
x˜1 − x˜3 SUB 1
( y˜2−y˜1
x˜2−x˜1
)(x˜1 − x˜3) MUL n2 + 2
y˜3 SUB 1
x˜3 SUB 1
Table 4.2: Operation Order for Weierstrass Affine Point Addition
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Point Doubling
x˜3 = [(
3x˜2
1
+a˜
2y˜1
)2 − 2x˜1] mod M
y˜3 = [(
3x˜2
1
+a˜
2y˜1
)(x˜1 − x˜3)− y˜1] mod M
~x1 y1~
1
x3~ y3~
a
~
Figure 4.7: Dataflow for Weierstrass Affine Point Doubling
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RESULT OP CYCLES
0 SET 1
x˜21 MUL n2 + 2
2x˜21 ADD 1
3x˜21 ADD 1
3x˜21 + a˜ ADD 1
2y˜1 ADD 1
2y1 MUL n2 + 2
3x˜2
1
+a˜
2y˜1
DIV 5n2 + 6
(
3x˜2
1
+a˜
2y˜1
)2 MUL n2 + 2
(
3x˜2
1
+a˜
2y˜1
)2 − x˜1 SUB 1
x˜3 SUB 1
x˜1 − x˜3 SUB 1
(
3x˜2
1
+a˜
2y˜1
)(x˜1 − x˜3) MUL n2 + 2
y˜3 SUB 1
x˜3 SUB 1
Table 4.3: Operation Order for Weierstrass Affine Point Doubling
Resource Usage and Operation Counts of Weierstrass Affine Unit
Resources: 2 mux, 1 mau, 1 reg
Initial Montgomery Transform 2 MUL
Addition Time with Affine Coordinates 1 DIV, 3 MUL, 7 ADD/SUB
Doubling Time with Affine Coordinates 1 DIV, 4 MUL, 9 ADD/SUB
Final Inverse Montgomery Transform 2 MUL
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4.2.2 Weierstrass Jacobian Point Addition and Doubling
Point Addition
X˜3 = (Y˜2Z˜
3
1 − Y˜1Z˜
3
2)
2 − (X˜2Z˜
2
1 − X˜1Z˜
2
2)
2(X˜2Z˜
2
1 + X˜1Z˜
2
2) mod M
Y˜3 =
(Y˜2Z˜31−Y˜1Z˜
3
2
)[(X˜2Z˜21−X˜1Z˜
2
2
)2(X˜2Z˜21+X˜1Z˜
2
2
)−2X˜3]−(X˜2Z˜21−X˜1Z˜
2
2
)3(Y˜2Z˜31+Y˜1Z˜
3
2
)
2
mod M
Z˜3 = (X˜2Z˜
2
1 − X˜1Z˜
2
2)Z˜1Z˜2 mod M
X1~~X2Z2~Z1~Y2~ ~Y1
~Z3Y3~X3~
Figure 4.8: Dataflow for Weierstrass Jacobian Point Addition
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RESULT OP CYCLES
0 SET 1
Z˜21 MUL n2 + 2
Y˜2Z˜1 MUL n2 + 2
Y˜2Z˜
3
1 MUL n2 + 2
X˜2Z˜
2
1 MUL n2 + 2
Z˜22 MUL n2 + 2
Y˜1Z˜2 MUL n2 + 2
Y˜1Z˜
3
2 MUL n2 + 2
X˜1Z˜
2
2 MUL n2 + 2
Z˜1Z˜2R MUL n2 + 2
(X˜2Z˜
2
1 − X˜1Z˜
2
2 ) SUB 1
(X˜2Z˜
2
1 + X˜1Z˜
2
2 ) ADD 1
(Y˜2Z˜
3
1 − Y˜1Z˜
3
2 ) SUB 1
(Y˜2Z˜
3
1 + Y˜1Z˜
3
2 ) ADD 1
Z˜3 MUL n2 + 2
(X˜2Z˜
2
1 − X˜1Z˜
2
2 )
2 MUL n2 + 2
(X˜2Z˜
2
1 − X˜1Z˜
2
2 )
2(X˜2Z˜
2
1 + X˜1Z˜
2
2 ) MUL n2 + 2
(X˜2Z˜
2
1 − X˜1Z˜
2
2 )
2(Y˜2Z˜
3
1 + Y˜1Z˜
3
2 ) MUL n2 + 2
(X˜2Z˜
2
1 − X˜1Z˜
2
2 )
3(Y˜2Z˜
3
1 + Y˜1Z˜
3
2 ) MUL n2 + 2
(Y˜2Z˜
3
1 − Y˜1Z˜
3
2 )
2 MUL n2 + 2
X˜3 SUB 1
(X˜2Z˜
2
1 − X˜1Z˜
2
2 )
2(X˜2Z˜
2
1 + X˜1Z˜
2
2 )− X˜3 SUB 1
(X˜2Z˜
2
1 − X˜1Z˜
2
2 )
2(X˜2Z˜
2
1 + X˜1Z˜
2
2 )− 2X˜3 SUB 1
(Y˜2Z˜
3
1 − Y˜1Z˜
3
2 )[(X˜2Z˜
2
1 − X˜1Z˜
2
2 )
2(X˜2Z˜
2
1 + X˜1Z˜
2
2 )− 2X˜3] MUL n2 + 2
2Y˜3 SUB 1
Y˜3 SHIFT 1
Table 4.4: Operation Order for Weierstrass Jacobian Point Addition
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Mixed Point Addition (Z2 = 1)
X˜3 = (Y˜2Z˜
3
1 − Y˜1)
2 − (X˜2Z˜
2
1 − X˜1)
2(X˜2Z˜
2
1 + X˜1) mod M
Y˜3 =
(Y˜2Z˜31−Y˜1)[(X˜2Z˜
2
1
−X˜1)2(X˜2Z˜21+X˜1)−2X˜3]−(X˜2Z˜
2
1
−X˜1)3(Y˜2Z˜31+Y˜1)
2 mod M
Z˜3 = (X˜2Z˜
2
1 − X˜1)Z˜1 mod M
RESULT OP CYCLES
0 SET 1
Z˜21 MUL n2 + 2
Y˜2Z˜1 MUL n2 + 2
Y˜2Z˜
3
1 MUL n2 + 2
X˜1Z˜
2
2 MUL n2 + 2
(X˜2Z˜
2
1 − X˜1) SUB 1
(X˜2Z˜
2
1 + X˜1) ADD 1
(Y˜2Z˜
3
1 − Y˜1) SUB 1
(Y˜2Z˜
3
1 + Y˜1) ADD 1
Z˜3 MUL n2 + 2
(X˜2Z˜
2
1 − X˜1)
2 MUL n2 + 2
(X˜2Z˜
2
1 − X˜1)
2(X˜2Z˜
2
1 + X˜1) MUL n2 + 2
(X˜2Z˜
2
1 − X˜1)
2(Y˜2Z˜
3
1 + Y˜1) MUL n2 + 2
(X˜2Z˜
2
1 − X˜1)
3(Y˜2Z˜
3
1 + Y˜1) MUL n2 + 2
(Y˜2Z˜
3
1 − Y˜1)
2 MUL n2 + 2
X˜3 SUB 1
(X˜2Z˜
2
1 − X˜1)
2(X˜2Z˜
2
1 + X˜1)− X˜3 SUB 1
(X˜2Z˜
2
1 − X˜1)
2(X˜2Z˜
2
1 + X˜1)− 2X˜3 SUB 1
(Y˜2Z˜
3
1 − Y˜1)[(X˜2Z˜
2
1 − X˜1)
2(X˜2Z˜
2
1 + X˜1)− 2X˜3] MUL n2 + 2
2Y˜3 SUB 1
Y˜3 SHIFT 1
Table 4.5: Operation Order for Weierstrass Jacobian-Affine Point Addition
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Point Doubling
X˜3 = (3X˜
2
1 + aZ˜
4
1)
2 − 8X˜1Y˜
2
1 mod M
Y˜3 = (3X˜
2
1 + aZ˜
4
1)(4X˜1Y˜
2
1 − X˜3)− 8Y˜
4
1 mod M
Z˜3 = 2Y˜1Z˜1 mod M
X1~
Y3~X3~ Z3~
~Y1Z1~a~
Figure 4.9: Dataflow for Weierstrass Jacobian Point Doubling
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RESULT OP CYCLES
0 SET 1
Y˜ 21 MUL n2 + 2
Z˜21 MUL n2 + 2
Z˜41 MUL n2 + 2
a˜Z˜41 MUL n2 + 2
X˜21 MUL n2 + 2
2X˜21 ADD 1
3X˜21 ADD 1
(3X˜21 + a˜Z˜
4
1 ) ADD 1
(3X˜21 + a˜Z˜
4
1 )
2 MUL n2 + 2
Y˜1Z˜1 MUL n2 + 2
Z˜3 ADD 1
X˜1Y˜
2
1 MUL n2 + 2
2X˜1Y˜
2
1 ADD 1
4X˜1Y˜
2
1 ADD 1
8X˜1Y˜
2
1 ADD 1
X˜3 SUB 1
(4X˜1Y˜
2
1 − X˜3) SUB 1
(3X˜21 + a˜Z˜
4
1 )(4X˜1Y˜
2
1 − X˜3)R MUL n2 + 2
Y˜ 41 MUL n2 + 2
2Y˜ 41 ADD 1
4Y˜ 41 ADD 1
8Y˜ 41 ADD 1
Y˜3 SUB 1
Table 4.6: Operation Order for Weierstrass Jacobian Point Doubling
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Final Inversion:
x = X˜ · (Z˜)2(M−2) mod M
y = Y˜ · (Z˜)3(M−2) mod M
Resource Usage and Operation Counts of Weierstrass Jacobian Unit
Resources: 2 mux, 1 mmu, 5 reg
Initial Montgomery Transform 2 MUL, 2 ADD
Addition Time with Jacobian Coordinates 16 MUL, 9 ADD/SUB
Addition Time with Jacobian-Affine Coordinates 11 MUL, 9 ADD/SUB
Doubling Time with Jacobian Coordinates 10 MUL, 13 ADD/SUB
Final Inversion 3n
2
+ 3 MUL (Average)
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4.2.3 Edwards Affine Point Addition and Doubling
Unified Point Addition & Doubling
x˜3 =
(x˜1y˜2+y˜1x˜2)
1+dx˜1x˜2y˜1y˜2
mod M
y˜3 =
(y˜1y˜2−x˜1x˜2)
1−dx˜1x˜2y˜1y˜2
mod M
x2x1 y1 y2
y3 x3
~ ~ ~ ~
~ ~
d
11
Figure 4.10: Dataflow for Edwards Affine Unified Point Addition & Doubling
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RESULT OP CYCLES
0 SET 1
y˜1y˜2 MUL n2 + 2
x˜1x˜2 MUL n2 + 2
(x˜1 + y˜1) ADD 1
(x˜2 + y˜2) ADD 1
(x˜1 + y˜1)(x˜2 + y˜2) MUL n2 + 2
[(x˜1 + y˜1)(x˜2 + y˜2)− x˜1x˜2] SUB 1
(x˜1y˜2 + y˜1x˜2) SUB 1
(y˜1y˜2 − x˜1x˜2) SUB 1
x˜1x˜2y˜1y˜2 MUL n2 + 2
dx1x2y1y2 MUL n2 + 2
1− dx1x2y1y2 SUB 1
1 + dx1x2y1y2 ADD 1
y˜3 DIV 5n2 + 6
x˜3 DIV 5n2 + 6
Table 4.7: Operation Order for Edwards Affine Unified Point Addition & Doubling
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Optimized Point Doubling
x˜3 =
2x˜1y˜1
x˜2
1
+y˜2
1
mod M
y˜3 =
x˜2
1
−y˜2
1
x˜2
1
+y˜2
1
−2
mod M
y1x1
y3 x3~ ~
~~
2
1
Figure 4.11: Dataflow for Edwards Affine Optimized Point Doubling
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RESULT OP CYCLES
0 SET 1
y˜21 MUL n2 + 2
x˜21 MUL n2 + 2
x˜1y˜1 MUL n2 + 2
2x˜1y˜1 ADD 1
(˜x
2
1 − y˜
2
1) SUB 1
(x˜21 + y˜
2
1) ADD 1
(x21 + y
2
1) MUL n2 + 2
(x21 + y
2
1 − 2) SUB 1
y˜3 DIV 5n2 + 6
x˜3 DIV 5n2 + 6
Table 4.8: Operation Order for Edwards Affine Optimized Point Doubling
Resource Usage and Operation Counts of Edwards Affine Unit
Resources: 2 mux, 1 mau, 3 reg
Initial Montgomery Transform 2 MUL
Unified Addition Time with Affine Coordinates 2 DIV, 5 MUL, 7 ADD/SUB
Optimized Doubling Time with Affine Coordinates 2 DIV, 4 MUL, 4 ADD/SUB
Final Inverse Montgomery Transform 2 MUL
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4.2.4 Edwards Projective Point Addition and Doubling
Unified Point Addition/Doubling
X3 = Z1Z2(X1Y2 + Y1X2)(Z
2
1Z
2
2 − dX1X2Y1Y2) mod M
Y3 = Z1Z2(Y1Y2 −X1X2)(Z
2
1Z
2
2 + dX1X2Y1Y2) mod M
Z3 = (Z
2
1Z
2
2 − dX1X2Y1Y2)(Z
2
1Z
2
2 + dX1X2Y1Y2) mod M
Y3 X3 Z3
X2X1 Y1 Y2 Z1 Z2d~
Figure 4.12: Dataflow for Edwards Projective Unified Point Addition & Doubling
47
RESULT OP CYCLES
0 SET 1
Z1Z2R MUL n2 + 2
Y1Y2R MUL n2 + 2
X1X2R MUL n2 + 2
(X1 + Y1)R ADD 1
(X2 + Y2)R ADD 1
(X1 + Y1)(X2 + Y2)R MUL n2 + 2
(X1Y2 + Y1X2 + Y1Y2)R SUB 1
(X1Y2 + Y1X2)R SUB 1
Z1Z2(X1Y2 + Y1X2)R MUL n2 + 2
(Y1Y2 −X1X2)R SUB 1
Z1Z2(Y1Y2 −X1X2)R MUL n2 + 2
X1X2Y1Y2R MUL n2 + 2
dX1X2Y1Y2R MUL n2 + 2
(Z1Z2)
2R MUL n2 + 2
[(Z1Z2)
2 + dX1X2Y1Y2]R ADD 1
[(Z1Z2)
2 − dX1X2Y1Y2]R SUB 1
Y3R MUL n2 + 2
Z3R MUL n2 + 2
X3R MUL n2 + 2
Table 4.9: Operation Order for Edwards Projective Unified Point Addition & Doubling
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Optimized Point Doubling
X3 = 2X1Y1(X
2
1 + Y
2
1 − 2Z
2
1) mod M
Y3 = (X
2
1 − Y
2
1 )(X
2
1 + Y
2
1 ) mod M
Z3 = (X
2
1 + Y
2
1 )(X
2
1 + Y
2
1 − 2Z
2
1) mod M
Y3 X3 Z3
Z1X1 Y1
Figure 4.13: Dataflow for Edwards Projective Optimized Point Doubling
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RESULT OP CYCLES
0 SET 1
Z21R MUL n2 + 2
2Z21R ADD 1
Y 21 R MUL n2 + 2
X21R MUL n2 + 2
X1Y1R MUL n2 + 2
2X1Y1R ADD 1
(X21 − Y
2
1 )R SUB 1
(X21 + Y
2
1 )R ADD 1
(X21 + Y
2
1 − 2Z
2
1 )R SUB 1
Z3R MUL n2 + 2
Y3R MUL n2 + 2
X3R MUL n2 + 2
Table 4.10: Operation Order for Edwards Projective Optimized Point Doubling
Final Inversion:
x = X · ZM−2 mod M
y = Y · ZM−2 mod M
Resource Usage and Operation Counts of Edwards Projective Unit
Resources: 2 mux, 1 mmu, 4 reg
Initial Montgomery Transform NOP
Unified Addition Time with Projective Coordinates 12 MUL, 7 ADD/SUB
Optimized Doubling Time with Projective Coordinates 7 MUL, 5 ADD/SUB
Final Inversion 3n
2
+ 1 MUL (Average)
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Unit
Weierstrass Weierstrass Edwards Edwards
Affine Jacobian Affine Projective
Resources 1 mau, 1 reg 1 mmu, 5 regs 1 mau, 3 regs 1 mmu, 4 regs
Addition 1CD + 2M + 7A 16M + 9A 2CD + 5M + 7A 12M + 7A
Mixed Addition Not Applicable 11M + 9A Not Applicable 11M + 7A
Doubling 1CD + 3M + 9A 10M + 13A 2CD + 3M + 4A 7M + 5A
Initial Transform 2M 2M + 2A 2M No Operation
Final Transform 2M 1ED + 4M 2M 1ED + 2M
(M: Multiplication, A: Addition & Subtraction, CD: Cheap Division, ED: Expensive Division)
Table 4.11: Number of Modular Operations for Point Addition and Doubling Units
4.2.5 Summary of Point Addition ad Doubling Operations
Table 4.11 shows the hardware resources, and the cost of point operations in terms of mod-
ular arithmetic operations for each unit. Looking at the operation counts, we observe that
operations with projective coordinates have better performance in the Edwards formula-
tion; whereas, operations with affine coordinates have better performance in the Weier-
strass formulation. Meanwhile, the comparison between Weierstrass affine and Edwards
projective operations depend on the performance ratio of division and multiplication. In
terms of area, the projective units have the advantage of using smaller arithmetic units.
However, they need more registers due to the increased complexity of the point operations
with projective coordinates, and additional storage requirement for Z-coordinates.
4.3 Point Multiplication Operations
After the implementation of point addition and doubling units, the final step is to imple-
ment multiplication of a point on the elliptic curve with a scalar in order to realize the
elliptic curve cryptosystem. We have introduced the binary multiplication methods, and
examined their side channel leakage properties in Chapter 3. To have a complete design
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space, we have implemented the add-always algorithm for all different ECC configura-
tions. In addition, the secure NAF algorithm presented in Algorithm 2 was implemented
for the Edwards formulation with unified addition and doubling operations. Table 4.12
shows the run times of the multiplication algorithms with the modular arithmetic opera-
tion costs of point additions and doublings taken from Table 4.11. Figure 4.14 shows the
generic block diagram of a point multiplication unit. Each individual system consists of
optimized datapath and control units to implement the point multiplication operations.
Algorithm: Add-Always Secure NAF
Number of Operations: n additions, n doublings 3n/2 unified additions
Weierstrass Affine
2nCD + (5n+4)M + 16nA Not Safe
Weierstrass Jacobian
1ED + (26n+6)M + (22n+2)A Not Safe
Edwards Affine
4nCD + (10n+4)M + 14nA 3nCD + (15n2 +4)M + 21n2 A
with Unified Doublings
Edwards Affine
4nCD + (8n+4)M + 11nA Not Safe
with Optimized Doublings
Edwards Projective
1ED + (24n+2)M + 14nA 1ED + (18n+2)M + 21n2 A
with Unified Doublings
Edwards Projective
1ED + (19n+2)M + 12nA Not Safe
with Optimized Doublings
(M: Multiplication, A: Addition & Subtraction, CD: Cheap Division, ED: Expensive Division)
Table 4.12: Number of Arithmetic Operations for Point Multiplication Units
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> mmu or mau
Addition
and
Doubling
Point
Control Unit
Multiplication
Point
Control Unit
a or d pP k
Multiplexer
Registers>
kP (mod p)
Registers>
Point Addition & Doubling Unit
Point Multiplication Unit
Figure 4.14: Block Diagram of Point Multiplication Units
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Chapter 5
Results and Performance Comparison
In this chapter, we analyze the hardware implementation results, compare the time and
area performance of our 8 different ECC configurations, and compare our results with
other hardware implementations in the literature. We start by presenting the synthesis re-
sults in terms of maximum frequency, computation time, area, and time-area product. In
Section 5.1, we explain the procedure of combining all ECC configurations and realizing
them as an ECC processor on a single chip. Then, we present the placement and routing
results of the ECC processor both with 0.18 µm CMOS technology and 0.18 µm MOS
Current-Mode Differential Logic (MCML) technology [21]. Finally we list the maximum
frequency, computation time and area values of our two best ECC implementations real-
ized with 0.18 µm CMOS technology for bit lengths of n = 160 and n = 192, together
with 4 other ECC implementations realized on FPGA.
Most ECC hardware implementations in the literature have been realized over binary
fields. There are only a small number of hardware implementations targeting prime fields,
mostly implemented in FPGA. We found two comparable ASIC implementations that
were recently published. Both implementations were realized using 0.13 µm CMOS
technology for bit length of n = 192 with no wireload model included. Moreover, they do
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Weierstrass Proj. − AA
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Edwards Aff. − AAU
Edwards Aff. − AAO
AA: Add-Always, AAO: Add-Always with Optimized Doublings, AAU: Add-Always with Unified Doublings
Figure 5.1: Time-Area Space of Point Multiplication
not address side-channel security. To be able to make fair comparison with our work, we
synthesized our design for bit length of n = 192. Our implementations were synthesized
using UMC 0.18 µm CMOS technology with a target clock of 3 ns, and with no wireload
model.
The overall gate count percentages of the arithmetic units for each ECC point mul-
tiplication system are provided in Table 5.1. Since the number of flip-flops in state ma-
chine registers are much less than storage registers, the area percentage of control units
are negligible in size. Therefore, the remaining area percentage is allocated mostly for
the storage registers. Figure 5.1 plots the time-area space of point multiplication. Both
Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1 show that the Weierstrass affine system has the best area-time
performance among our implementations, whereas the Weierstrass projective system has
the worst area-time performance. In comparison to other implementations, 7 out of our
8 implementations have less area, and 4 out of our 8 implementations have better timing,
although we use a slower technology, and address side-channel security as well.
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ECC Multiplication Platform Max Time Area Area×
System Algorithm f Time
Weierstrass Add-Always 0.18 µm 333.3 0.86 91K gates 78.26Affine CMOS MHz ms (mau: 55.0%) gates×s
Weierstrass Add-Always 0.18 µm 333.3 1.59 110K gates 174.90Projective CMOS MHz ms (mmu: 28.4%) gates×s
Edwards Add-Always with 0.18 µm 333.3 1.48 94K gates 139.12
Affine Unif. Doublings CMOS MHz ms (mau: 53.9%) gates×s
Edwards Add-Always with 0.18 µm 333.3 1.42 94K gates 133.48
Affine Opt. Doublings CMOS MHz ms (mau: 53.9%) gates×s
Edwards Secure NAF 0.18 µm 333.3 1.12 93K gates 104.16Affine CMOS MHz ms (mau: 54.5%) gates×s
Edwards Add-Always with 0.18 µm 333.3 1.47 92K gates 135.24
Projective Unif. Doublings CMOS MHz ms (mmu: 34.3%) gates×s
Edwards Add-Always with 0.18 µm 333.3 1.18 92K gates 108.56
Projective Opt. Doublings CMOS MHz ms (mmu: 34.3%) gates×s
Edwards Secure NAF 0.18 µm 333.3 1.13 92K gates 103.96Projective CMOS MHz ms (mmu: 34.3%) gates×s
Satoh et al. NAF 0.13 µm 137.7 1.44 110K gates 158.402003 [54] CMOS MHz ms gates×s
Sozzani et al. Add-Double 0.13 µm 294.0 1.33 108K gates 143.642005 [55] CMOS MHz ms gates×s
Table 5.1: Comparison of Synthesis Results for Point Multiplication [GF (p) 192− bit]
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5.1 ECC Processor
To be able to make a performance comparison among our 8 individual implementations
as well as with other ASIC implementations, we used post-synthesis results. Our next
step is to realize all implementations on a single chip. In this case, it does not make sense
to implement very similar but locally optimized units as seperate entities. We combined
all our implementations as an ECC processor that is capable of all different versions of
point multiplication algorithms, and realized it on a single chip. The point addition and
doubling units, detailed in Section 4.2, all have similar datapaths. But the datapaths are
optimized together with the addition & doubling control unit to obtain the best perfor-
mance out of an application, as if it would be used for the cryptosystem. We tried to
achive least possible register usage and combinational logic complexity for each differ-
ent point addition and doubling unit. For example Weierstrass affine point addition and
doubling operations need only a single temporary register; whereas, Weierstrass Jacobian
point addition and doubling operations need 5 temporary registers and a larger multiplexer
to be able to select form each register. Similarly, the point multiplication units are also
optimized for each specific case. For example 2 coordinates are used with affine opera-
tions; whereas, 3 coordinates are used projective operations. We merged all entities on a
single datapath, going through the following steps:
1. The first step was to merge all 4 different point addition and doubling units (Weier-
strass affine, Weierstrass Jacobian, Edwards affine, and Edwards projective) on a
single datapath. Among these units, Weierstrass Jacobian needs the most number
of registers and a multiplexer capable of selecting from each register. Therefore,
we used the datapath of Weierstrass Jacobian unit, although not all registers are
necessarily needed by other addition and doubling units.
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2. As the second step, we replaced the mmu (modular multiplication, addition and
subtraction unit) in the projective implementations with mau (modular multiplica-
tion, division, addition and subtraction unit), although these implementations never
use the division operation in mau.
3. After having the same multiplexer, arithmetic unit and register number in all point
addition and doubling units, as the third step, we clearly seperated the state ma-
chines and datapaths in each unit. Therefore, we were able to have a single datapath
unit, and 4 different point addition and doubling control units.
4. Next, we merged the datapath parts of the 2 different multiplication algorithms
(add-always, secure NAF) in a single datapath. We also merged the multiplication
control units in a single state machine.
5. Finally, we added serial input reading and output writing functionality in this com-
bined multiplication state machine, so that it can interface with the limited number
of IO pads of the chip.
Eventually all components are put together as shown in Figure 5.2, and the ECC pro-
cessor was realized both with 0.18 µm CMOS technology, and 0.18 µm MOS Current-
Mode Differential Logic (MCML) technology [21] 1 as shown in Figure 5.3. Table 5.2
presents the time and area values after placement and routing. Finally, we are also pre-
senting the P&R results of our 2 best implementations for bit lengths of n = 160 and
n = 192, together with several FPGA implementation results in Table 5.3.
1MCML technology has a power balanced IC library, and provides DCA resiliency as mentioned in
Section 3.2.
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Point Multiplication
and IO Interface
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>
Point Addition & Doubling
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Multiplexer
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Point Addition & Doubling
Conventional Affine
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M
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Conventional Projective
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>
ECC Processor
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P, M, a or d, Rsquare Alg. & Imp. Select
Figure 5.2: Block Diagram of Elliptic Curve Processor
Technology Critical Path Delay Cell Area
UMC CMOS 0.18 µm 6.8 ns 1.29 mm2
LAUREL MCML 0.18 µm 15 ns 6.99 mm2
Table 5.2: P&R Results for the ECC Processor
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Figure 5.3: Elliptic Curve Processor Realized on a Single Chip
ECC GF(p) Platform Max Time Area
System Field f
Weierstrass
160
0.18 µm 147 1.37
86K gatesAffine CMOS MHz ms
Edwards
160
0.18 µm 147 1.80
86K gatesProjective CMOS MHz ms
Weierstrass
192
0.18 µm 147 1.95
100K gatesAffine CMOS MHz ms
Edwards
192
0.18 µm 147 2.56
101K gatesProjective CMOS MHz ms
Ors et al.
160
XILINX 91.3 14.4
115.5K gates2003 [56] XCV1000E-8 MHz ms
Mentens et al.
160
XILINX 66 26.8 4826 slices,
2007 [57] XC3S5000-5 MHz ms 66 RAMs, 66 mults
Mcivor et al.
256
XILINX 34.46 3.86 15755 slices,
2006 [58] XC2VP125-7 MHz ms 256 mults
Sakiyama et al.
256
XILINX 40 17.7
27597 slices2007 [59] XC3S5000-5 MHz ms
Table 5.3: P&R Results for Point Multiplication
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this dissertation, we addressed the design and implementation of high performance
non-specialized elliptic curve cryptosystems over finite fields of prime characteristics,
while retaining side-channel awareness. Our investigation also included the recently in-
troduced Edwards elliptic curves with built-in resiliency against simple side-channel at-
tacks.
We presented methods to improve the performance of ECC building blocks with side-
channel attack precautions, and explained the details for efficient mapping to hardware.
Many optimizations had been previously proposed for the Weierstrass formulation, aimed
at reducing the cost of point addition and doubling operations, as well as decreasing the
number of point additions and doublings. Unfortunately, most of these optimizations
made the systems prone to side-channel attacks. We avoided reducing the number of point
additions, and discussed methods to uniformly order the distinguishable point operations
of Weierstrass elliptic curves for achieving a scalar point multiplication resistant against
simple side-channel attacks. We also introduced our secure version of NAF multiplication
algorithm to work with unified point addition and doubling operations of Edwards elliptic
curves.
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We implemented 8 different ECC point multiplication systems, and synthesized each
configuration with UMC 0.18 µm CMOS technology:
1. Weierstrass affine using add-always algorithm,
2. Weierstrass projective using add-always algorithm,
3. Edwards affine with unified doublings using add-always algorithm,
4. Edwards affine with optimized doublings using add-always algorithm,
5. Edwards affine with unified doublings using secure NAF algorithm,
6. Edwards projective with unified doublings using add-always algorithm,
7. Edwards projective with optimized doublings using add-always algorithm,
8. Edwards projective with unified doublings using secure NAF algorithm.
Then, we combined all ECC configurations as an ECC processor, and realized it on a
single chip with 0.18 µm CMOS technology, and also with 0.18 µm MOS Current-Mode
Differential Logic (MCML) technology [21] to provide resiliency against differential side
channel attacks.
Edwards elliptic curves were shown to be faster than previous elliptic curve formu-
lations [19] in addition to their advantages for side-channel security. However, due to
more complicated point operations of Edwards affine formulation, the performance bene-
fits were only applicable for projective coordinates. Therefore, with the availability of an
efficient divider, Weierstrass affine formulation still offered the best performance. Using
projective coordinates had both positive and negative effects on the total cell area. Avoid-
ing the implementation of a divider allowed reducing the area. However, more compli-
cated point addition and doubling operations required using more temporary registers.
Moreover, using 3 instead of 2 coordinates to represent a point increased the area to store
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the temporary points during point multiplication. The adverse effects of all these addi-
tional register requirements were exacerbated when each binary digit was stored in 2 bits
due to our choice of using the redundant binary representation to implement fast modular
operations. Finally, with the use of efficient resource sharing between divider and mul-
tiplier, the area cost of implementing the divider was reduced. Indeed, we observed that
the area cost of additional register usage canceled out the area gain of not implementing
a divider. Thus, the areas of affine and projective systems had almost same values that
were in the range 91K-94K, except the Weierstrass Projective implementation. The com-
plicated formulations of Weierstrass Projective system consumed an area of 110K even
without a divider. Having lost the advantage of area reduction, the only attraction to use
projective coordinates would have been timing optimization by avoiding divisions. How-
ever, in our implementation the division/multiplication timing ratio was only 4, and was
not enough to make the projective operations significantly faster. Therefore, we obtained
the time costs presented in Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1.
We showed that, in an efficient hardware implementation, Weierstrass formulation
with affine coordinates offered the best performance due to its simplicity, and Edwards
superseded Weierstrass formulation only when projective coordinates were used. The
fact that affine systems would offer better performance than projective systems was also
pointed out in [60–62], which demonstrated that it would be profitable to investigate effi-
cient inversion architectures to be able to use the simpler formulations with affine coordi-
nates.
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